Last weekend, I didn’t know whether to laugh or cry when I saw Enbridge’s huge advert in The Vancouver Sun claiming its Northern Gateway project would make “B.C.’s North Coast safer for all vessels”.

The company must be cursing the timing of the terrible oil spill now reaching the shores of Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana and Florida.

Enbridge’s proposal doesn’t involve an oil rig, but the spill demonstrates yet again what oil response experts have always said: once the oil is in the water, you’re hooped.

Anyway, this weekend I downloaded Volume 8A of Enbridge’s proposal to the National Energy Board – the volume dealing with marine transportation.

A lot of the info is simply background filler, and despite being 152 pages long, details are very sketchy.

For example, talking about the type of tankers to be used, Enbridge’s report notes: “At this stage of the project, there is limited information regarding marketing plans, trade routes, or details of potential charterers or their tankers and, as a result, specific plans or technical documents of the design ships cannot be provided.”

However, here are some the key parts of the plan, as described in the report.

How much extra traffic?

About 220 vessels per year would travel through Douglas Channel, an increase of 86 per cent compared to current traffic to Kitimat. At Wright Sound, the project-related tankers would cause a 13 per cent increase in reporting traffic. And at the Prince Rupert MCTS station, project-related tankers would cause an increase of 3 per cent for the total reporting traffic.

What route would the tankers take?

The tankers would use one of three main routes:

1. The Northern Approach (for tankers arriving from or departing to Asian ports). 158 nautical miles. Via Haida Gwaii through Dixon Entrance, Hecate Strait, Browning Entrance, Principe Channel, Nepean Sound, Otter Channel, Squally Channel, Lewis Passage, Wright Sound and Douglas Channel.

2. The Southern Approach (Direct) (for tankers arriving from or departing to west coast ports south of Kitimat) 98 naut. miles. Via Queen Charlotte Sound, Hecate Strait, Caamaño Sound, Campania Sound, Squally Channel, Lewis Passage, Wright Sound and Douglas Channel.

3. The Southern Approach (via Principe Channel), (in weather conditions where Caamaño Sound cannot be used) 133 naut. miles. This route goes via Hecate Strait, Browning Entrance, Principe Channel, Nepean Sound, Otter Channel, Squally Channel, Lewis Passage, Wright Sound and Douglas Channel.

What kind of tankers would be used?

Tankers calling at the Kitimat Terminal would, most likely, be chartered. They would all be double-hulled, due to international regulations requiring all tankers in international trade to be double hulled by 2010.

Most likely, Aframax or Suezmax tankers would carry condensate and the larger VLCC (supertankers) and Suezmax tankers would carry export oil cargo.

Pilots, escort and harbor tugs

Local pilots would board and assist all incoming and outgoing tankers. During good weather and in daylight, helicopters might be used to lower pilots onto the tanker.

A close escort tug would be used for all laden and ballasted (empty) tankers, beginning at the pilot boarding stations (Triple Island and proposed sites in Browning Passage and Caamaño Sound) to and from the marine terminal. The close escort tug would normally be positioned approximately 500 metres astern of the tanker, or as directed by the shipmaster or pilot during transit.

* A tethered tug, in addition to a close escort tug, would be used for all laden tankers in the Confined Channel Assessment Area (CCAA). The tug would be tethered to the stern of the laden tanker at all times, ready to assist with steering or slowing down.

* Three or four tugs for berthing and two or three tugs for unberthing the tanker. One of these tugs could also provide escort services.

Rescue tugs

At least one of the escort tugs would be equipped to provide ocean rescue capability and would be available to any ship in distress along the north coast of British Columbia.

Tanker speed

Average tanker speeds close to shore would be 8 to 12 knots: eight to 10 knots in confined areas and 10 to 12 knots in straight channel areas such as Principe Channel and Douglas Channel.

Navigation aids

Radar would be installed along important sections of the Northern and Southern Approaches to monitor all marine traffic and provide additional guidance to pilots and other vessels in the area.

* See my earlier post: What if a tanker heading for Kitimat hit another vessel?

A second story about the strong ties between Prince Rupert, B.C. and Memphis, Tennessee has also gone online:
Prince Rupert looks towards Memphis

Vancouver longshore worker Karen Crossan (pictured) stood in the ghostly dispatch hall looking vainly for work on tonight’s graveyard shift.

“I’m bored and I am broke,” she said, after learning there was no work that night, yet again. “There were 150 jobs for the afternoon shift, but only a few casuals got out.”

Crossan only comes in from Port Coquitlam twice a week nowadays looking for work, as it’s usually a wasted 40-minute trip each way. She last worked ten days ago.

In the first eight months of 2009, she clocked less than 300 hours work as a B Board casual in International Longshore and Warehouse Union Local 500. This year, B Board casuals like Crossan will be lucky to make $30,000, compared with an average $70,000 last year.

The recession has hit the dockworkers in British Columbia hard, with work hours down by 600,000 hours or 17.6 per cent – the equivalent of 400 full-time jobs.

Container work has taken the biggest dive, and Vancouver’s Local 500 has seen a 23 per cent drop in work hours from January to the end of August 2009, year-on-year.

While full union members are surviving, the 1,200 casuals have suffered dramatically, especially on the lower boards. In Vancouver, A Board casuals get preference over those on B, C, T and OO Boards and the numbers speak for themselves.

According to Gordie Westrand, president of Local 500, last year’s A Board easily averaged $87,000 last year. This year, they’ll be lucky to make $50,000.

T Board casuals last year made about $30,000 last year; this year, maybe $2,000 or $3,000. The way things are going, Westrand predicted it could be 2020 before they become full union members. As for the OO Boards, they made $15,000 to $20,000 in 2008. This year, a pitiful $51 to date.

“There’s just despair,” Westrand told Maritime Magazine. Some regulars on the C Boards, who have been coming to the dispatch hall for the last four years only worked one day last month. They can’t afford to pay rent, and have run out of employment insurance. He said one guy has been forced to live in his car as he can’t pay his rent any more.

“I’ve been down on the waterfront for 44 years and seen some of the worst recessions. The 1975 one lasted from mid-April to mid-September. But this one has already lasted longer: from January until now (September),” he added.

Crossan realizes she’s luckier than most, with money still coming in from her husband, a full union longshore worker. But even these union members aren’t getting the work they like.

“Lots of the guys are having to do jobs they haven’t done for 20 years. I feel for them,” she said.

Tom Dufresne, president of ILWU Canada, said the union took on 700 new workers about two years ago and trained them to handle the boom. Now there’s no work for them.

The union is also preparing to negotiate its contract with the BC Maritime Employers Association, with talks due to start Dec.1. The contract expires March 31. “I think it’s going to be an interesting round of negotiations,” said Dufresne.

Over on Vancouver Island, work hours are down 17 per cent this year compared with 2008. Unlike Vancouver, they don’t handle container traffic, and never really benefited from the boom.

Brett Hartley, president of ILWU Local 508, said that the downturn in the forest industry and closure of many mills has caused a steady decline in work in the last ten years. There were about 400 union members in 1999; now there are 115 union members. At the beginning of this year, there were also 60 to 70 casuals but Hartley is not sure what the numbers are now.

“They’ve been taking a beating,” said Hartley. “Some of them have been hit twice.” A lot of mill workers became longshore casuals when mills closed or took down time, and are now suffering again.

The Vancouver Island local is based in Chemainus but uses a telephone dispatch system to cover its vast area. Workers may live in Victoria and travel to work in Port Alberni three hours away, an increasingly expensive proposition.

Currently, the biggest source of work is handling raw log exports at Port Alberni, Nanaimo and Island Timberlands’ terminal, south of Nanaimo.

It’s dangerous work and some people disapprove of raw log exports, but Hartley said it was happening anyway. Logs were being towed or barged to U.S. ports and exported to China, Korea and Japan from there. The union intervened, and now at least its members are getting the work in B.C.

At Cowichan Bay, the export of Western Forest Products lumber has really slumped. Full ships carrying 21 to 24 million board feet of lumber used to sail tor the eastern U.S. every month. So far this year, only four vessels have arrived and they left half-empty.

“It’s not a pretty picture,” Hartley concluded. “The difficult part from our view is that this scenario has been going on for a number of years. It’s always been a scramble.”

© 2009 Maritime Magazine

When a ship gets into trouble off the remote west coast of Vancouver Island, there are very few rescue services around.

The province relies on a commercial tug in the area being able to help out. Currently, major seagoing tugs carry electronic tracking devices so they can be located in real-time on computer charts. This information is provided to US and Canadian Marine Vessel Traffic Services to refer to if there is an emergency request for tug assistance. This is known as a “tug-of-opportunity”.

Apart from the fact that there may not be a tug capable of holding a large ship cruising by at the right time, there are several other flaws in this arrangement.

As consultant Stafford Reid points out in a recent report: “This arrangement also assumes that the tug has a place to harbour its tow (logs, barge), and that the environmental conditions for rescue do not put the crew in danger.”

“Lastly, the tug-of-opportunity relies on the captain and crew to have the training, skills, and equipment to ‘snag’ a vessel and to keep it ‘at station’ until additional assistance arrives or a place of refuge decision can be made on where to tow the vessel.”

In his report, Major Marine Casualty Risk and Response Preparedness in British Columbia, Reid looks at what might happen if a 67,000-deadweight container ship carrying 5,000 containers lost engine power during a severe storm off the west coast of Vancouver Island.

He notes that containerships often travel within 20 to 30 nautical miles offshore, and there is no guarantee that a tug coming to the rescue would actually be able to fix a line and hold the vessel at a steady state (at station) in severe storm conditions.

If the vessel did run aground, it might release 1,500 metric tons (11,500 barrels) of heavy bunker fuel oil and 800 metric tons (6,100 barrels) of marine diesel. In addition, 500 containers might fall overboard.

Nootka Island lies off Vancouver Island, to the west of Gold River, and spill response in such a remote, exposed area would be difficult. Although heavy surf would help clean up the oil naturally in exposed regions, a lot of semi-protected environments, created by small islands and reefs, would be affected. Birds and mammals, including marbled murrelets and sea otters, would be at risk. It’s an area with strong First Nations interests, which would also need to be respected.

Reid says that containers that fall overboard are a pollution and navigation hazard in themselves, and several are likely to have hazardous material products inside.

“There is no salvage plan for British Columbia on how to track and remove floating and/or stranded containers – let alone any cargo materials released from any damaged containers,” warns Reid.

As well, although B.C. has set up a Marine Chemical Emergency Response regime for dealing with hazardous materials, it has not been adopted or tested by industry or the federal government.

He says the gaps in B.C.’s oil spill response regime have been studied several times, but nothing has been done to correct them.

“Since 1995, Canada’s west coast has only had a few near misses from drifting vessels, and as a result the public and political pressure in British Columbia quickly waned.”

Reid makes several recommendations aimed at decreasing the risk of a grounding of a major vessel. In the report, prepared for Living Oceans Society, he suggests:

* The Canadian shipping industry should share in the funding of the Neah Bay dedicated tug in Washington State as it confers a direct benefit to the industry and to the protection of British Columbia’s south coast. A dedicated rescue tug has been stationed either part-time or full-time at Neah Bay, on the Olympic Peninsula since 1999.

* A dedicated rescue (assist) tug should be considered for the central coast of British Columbia. The tug’s size, specifications, equipment and training should include salvage, cargo and bunker lightering, firefighting and other response capabilities.

Provincial and federal response set up differently

In his 144-page report, Reid also criticizes the complex web of agencies involved in handling any marine oil spill, saying it is inefficient, increasingly under-staffed and that agencies often work in totally different ways.

Typically, the Canadian Coast Guard is responsible (the lead agency) for a spill in the water, while the B.C. Ministry of the Environment is responsible for spills on land.

However, the way the federal and provincial agencies do business after an oil spill are not “on the same playing field.” This means that when spills in the water reach land, jurisdictional and communication problems can easily arise.

The B.C. Ministry of the Environment uses the same structure as in the U.S., known as the Incident Command System. In this method, all the parties involved, including the Responsible Party (ship owner/operator), work together in a unified, shared command structure.

Meanwhile, the Canadian Coast Guard uses a totally different system known as the Response Management System, where it is solely in charge of making decisions.

Reid warns that the lack of harmony and lack of a positive relationship between the province and federal governments could seriously undermine effective response to a vessel casualty or marine oil spill.

He adds: “It doesn’t serve industry nor coastal communities well to let complacency slip in. British Columbians should expect worldwide “best achievable” practices to be used both in vessel casualty prevention and response measures.”

Earlier posts:
What if a tanker heading for Kitimat hit another vessel?
Tug escort rules vary in B.C.

Download the report:
Major Marine Casualty Risk and Response Preparedness in British Columbia (large PDF file)

I must admit I was a little surprised not to get a straight answer from Transport Canada at first about the number of tug escorts traveling with condensate tankers into Kitimat.

I assumed it was clearly set down in the legislation whether tankers carrying this kind of hydrocarbon mixture required tug escorts and, if so, how many.

After all, set rules are laid down for laden oil tankers passing through Haro Strait. They are required to travel with tug escorts, as are laden crude oil tankers leaving the port of Vancouver, typically from Kinder Morgan Canada’s Westridge Terminal in Burnaby.

Looking beyond our borders, both Alaska and Washington State also have clear rules requiring laden oil tankers to have escort tugs alongside when passing through the narrow passages of their coastal waters. In some places, these tugs have to be tethered with the tanker.

However, when I called Transport Canada to ask about tug escorts in Douglas Channel, they told me to check with Methanex Corp., as they weren’t sure the details of Methanex’s TERMPOL agreement were public information. After a couple of days, they finally did tell me. The short answer is no: the condensate tankers visiting Methanex don’t have to have tug escorts. (Comments from Methanex’s Kevin Henderson appear later in this piece).

TERMPOL is short for Technical Review Process of Marine Terminal Systems and Transshipment Sites and refers to the route a specific vessel takes in Canadian waters through to its berth at a marine terminal or transshipment site. It also covers the process of cargo handling between vessels, or off-loading from ship to shore.

In other words, individual agreements are made between Transport Canada and the terminals, and the regulations vary site to site.

Stafford Reid discusses this kind of inconsistency and lack of transparency in his recent report: “Major Marine Casualty Risk and Response Preparedness in British Columbia”, prepared for Living Oceans Society. (To download PDF report, click here)

He notes that even when regulations are in place, such as through Haro Strait, the current standards are more than 19 years old and haven’t been tested.

“The lack of transparency on whether these standards are being met or remain relevant leaves one wondering about tug escort efficacy,” he says.

“It doesn’t serve industry nor coastal communities well to let complacency slip in. British Columbians should expect world-wide “best achievable” practices to be used both in vessel casualty prevention and response measures.”

Reid suggests Transport Canada (Marine Safety) needs to reassess the Canadian Escort Tug Standard for Haro Strait and Boundary Pass and be prepared to write a new standard that is founded on worldwide “best practices” for tug escort of laden oil tankers. They should also be consistent with escort requirements for oil tankers transiting the State of Washington’s waters and requirements under the U.S. Oil Pollution Act of 1990.

“The rules should be fully transparent to other agencies and the public regarding the frequency of tug escort, what tugs are used (with specifications), escort positioning/emergency protocols, crew training (nature and frequency), exercises and field tests, near misses and other information,” he adds.

Methanex responds

So what does Methanex have to say about the lack of tug escorts and Stafford Reid’s concerns about the way marine accidents are handled in B.C.?

Kevin Henderson, Methanex’s vice president of manufacturing North America, says that the company has never had a release or shipping incident in the 26 years that tankers have called at the Kitimat terminal.

Methanex used to export methanol produced in Kitimat but now imports methanol as well as condensate, always in double-hulled tankers. This year, 10 tankers have arrived in Kitimat carrying condensate and another one is expected before the end of 2008.

Asked if they should have tug escorts, Henderson says that question is more appropriately addressed to Transport Canada or the Canadian Coast Guard. However, he adds: “I think you have to look at our record. We have been shipping since 1982 and all I can say is that the captains are extremely comfortable coming down Douglas Channel. It’s a wide channel.”

He also notes that each vessel typically carries two pilots on board. The journey sometimes takes longer than eight hours, and Pacific Pilotage Authority regulations kick in, requiring the pilot to hand off to a second pilot.

In the event of a spill, Henderson says the company has an agreement with Burrard Clean that they will act as first responders and a spill response plan that is practiced every year, and includes spill response on water.

“They store a huge amount of equipment in Kitimat and every ship that comes in has to have an agreement in place with Burrard Clean,” he says.

In the event of a condensate spill, he says the product was non-persistent, so the plan would be to control the spill and keep it in open water away from land until it evaporated.

Methanex’s first TERMPOL was approved in 1982, and a revised plan was submitted to account for condensate tankers. According to Henderson, the revised plan was accepted by Transport Canada in summer 2007.

Given Methanex’s good marine safety record, why does it matter if their vessels don’t have tug escorts and whether the marine response in Kitimat is adequate?

The answer, of course, is that accidents can happen at any time, and because B.C.’s marine response regime is patchy at best. And because Enbridge is raising the stakes by looking at bringing in supertankers into Kitimat.

Related posts:
What if a tanker heading for Kitimat hit another vessel?
What if a containership ran aground on Nootka Island?

Download the report:
Major Marine Casualty Risk and Response Preparedness in British Columbia (large PDF file)

What would happen if a tanker on its way to Kitimat collided with a tug in the scenic Inside Passage?

According to the author of a new report, major flaws would be exposed in the way marine accidents are handled here in British Columbia.

“Nobody is essentially watching the store – at least not the whole building,” says EnviroEmerg consultant Stafford Reid, near the end of a mammoth 144-page report quietly released in mid-September.

His report, commissioned by the environmental group Living Oceans Society, has the unwieldy title “Major Marine Casualty Risk and Response Preparedness in British Columbia”. But it is a mine of information about all that is wrong – and right – with B.C.’s ability to cope with oil spills from tankers, ships of all kinds, and the numerous tugs and barges.

Reid is a former environmental emergency planner with the B.C. Ministry of Environment, so has an insider’s knowledge of the muddled mess of agencies and turf wars involved in handling any oil spill or marine accident of any kind in B.C. waters.

His report says that the shipping industry in B.C. is generally well-managed, but marine risk is increasing as vessel traffic volumes and ship sizes increase.

“A major vessel accident can happen anytime, any place and for any reason,” he warns.

In one of six accident scenarios, Reid explores what would happen if a 35,000-deadweight “Handysize” tanker carrying condensate collided with a northbound tug in Wright Sound, while on its way to Kitimat.

As tankers go, this is a small one, the same size as those now bringing condensate to the Methanex’s terminal in Kitimat under an agreement with EnCana Midstream & Marketing – a major oilsands producer in Alberta.

Tankers are a hot topic at the moment, as not only is tanker activity increasing in B.C.’s waters, but supertankers could be heading for Kitimat if Enbridge’s major pipeline plans go ahead.

In his scenario, Reid notes that higher vessel traffic means a tanker crossing Wright Sound is more likely to run into problems here than while transiting the long narrow Douglas Channel leading to Kitimat.

Wright Sound is also where the B.C. ferry Queen of the North infamously sank after hitting a rock in March 2006. Two passengers died, and oil spread throughout the Sound. The ferry is still in its watery grave, 400 metres below the surface, making it too deep to send in divers and technically difficult to raise. It’s not clear whether any fuel is still on board.

So what would happen? In his spill scenario, Reid says a collision between a tanker carrying 36,500 metric tons (280,000 barrels) of condensate and a tug might damage two of the bigger vessel’s five starboard tanks, leading to a spill of up to 3,000 metric tons (23,000 barrels) in the water,. The tug and its crew would not be injured, he assumes.

Condensates are liquid hydrocarbon mixtures used to dilute the thick tar in the oilsands so it can flow more easily through pipelines. And because B.C.’s response regime is geared only to oilspills, other problems could arise. For example:

* In Canada, owners of ships and coastal oil handling facilities are required to make an arrangement with a response organization to handle an oilspill. In B.C., companies pay an annual fee to Burrard Clean Operation to handle any such spills.

However, Reid notes that response organizations are not required to plan, prepare and respond to condensates or biofuels. They are neither equipped nor required to respond, he says.

* Condensates are volatile and potentially explosive, posing safety and health hazards to spill cleanup crews. “Condensates fall very closely into the hazardous materials category,” he says. “B.C. has essentially no hazardous material response capability for a vessel-based incident.”

* The response strategy is to simply let it evaporate, as condensate is non-recoverable. However, the impact on the marine environment would be short but harsh. Whales, seals, otters, and birds would all suffer.

* Unlike the U.S., though, Canada and British Columbia do not have a Natural Resource Damage Assessment (NRDA) process i.e. a way to recoup costs for damages to the environment after the cleanup is completed.

* Although the condensate is being shipped for EnCana, the company is not responsible for any clean-up or lasting damage to the environment.

Rhona DelFrari, EnCana’s media relations advisor, says in an interview: “We only purchase the condensate when it reaches the terminal. We’re not in the shipping business.”

She says the company buys condensate from different suppliers, and its role is limited to having the right to approve a shipping company. “We want to make sure it’s a reputable company.”

Canada works on the “polluter-pay principle”, meaning the ship owner (and its insurers) are responsible for clean-up. However, the amount of funding available and how it can be used depends on the type and size of vessel, and the kind of cargo it is carrying. There are also legally defined limits to the amount of money a ship owner has to pay, called the “limit of financial liability”. After that, government foots the bill.

Reid says that because condensate is not classified as a persistent oil, funds for response, compensation and any penalties would come only from the ship owner’s Protection and Indemnity Insurance (P &I Club). Esssentially, there’s less money in the kitty if a major environmental disaster occurs.

A tanker the same size, but carrying crude oil, would also be eligible for approximately $200 million for clean-up from the International Oil Pollution Funds (CLC/IOPC) or Canada’s domestic Ship-source Oil Pollution Fund (SOPF), but in this case, only the ship’s insurers would pay.

“The financial risk is not very well understood. When would the money run out and it be handed over to the government to pay?” says Reid in an interview Friday (Nov.22).

Related posts:
Tug escort rules vary in B.C.
What if a containership ran aground on Nootka Island?

Download the report:
Major Marine Casualty Risk and Response Preparedness in British Columbia (large PDF file)

The Ship That Will Not Die has finally been laid to rest, after nearly a decade stuck in the surf zone of a remote Oregon beach.

Titan Salvage used the jack-up barges Karlissa A and Karlissa B to remove the last visible remains of the New Carissa this week.

The stern of the New Carissa in 1999

The Florida-based company signed a $16.5 million US contract with Oregon Department of State Lands last year and salvage work on the rusting remains of the stern began in May.

Wendy Wiles, from Oregon’s Department of Environmental Quality, told the 2008 Pacific States/B.C. Oil Spill Task Force meeting in Victoria, B.C. recently that very little oil was released during the salvage project.

A series of failed attempts to remove the wreck followed after the ship ran aground during a storm on Feb. 4, 1999, leaking about 70,000 gallons of oil and killing around 2,300 seabirds.

The lawsuits also followed but in 2006, Oregon State Land Board approved a $22 million US settlement with the owners, and used most of the money to sign the current salvage contract with Titan.

See also:
* My story after landing on the wreck of the New Carissa in 1999
* The New Carissa Saga on Oregon Department of State Lands website
* U.S. Navy picture after blowing up the bow section with a torpedo

It looks like a primitive computer game, but this real-time ship tracking system on the BoatingSF.com website shows the containership Cosco Busan hitting the Bay Bridge in San Francisco Bay last November.

The ship, leaving its berth in Oakland in heavy fog with the required pilot on board, is shown as a bright red arrow in the right of the animation. Its tug is shown as the blue arrow trailing in its wake of the containership. After hitting the bridge span, the ship anchors, and the tug scurries away.

More than 53,000 gallons of bunker fuel spilled into the Bay, killing at least 1,800 birds, oiling another 1,000, and triggering enormous clean-up costs.

U.S. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer Jonathan Cilley

A barrage of bills in the wake of the spill last year is now in political limbo. California lawmakers were highly critical over the spill response and passed a series of bills to address the problems. But now an impasse between the state’s Republican Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger and the Democratic-controlled legislature has put the bills in limbo.

The state budget was due to be set on July 1, but still hasn’t been decided. In retaliation, the governor vowed to veto all 800-plus bills under consideration – including the oilspill bills – unless lawmakers first approve a state budget by Sept.30.

“We’re all putting on our helmets and waiting to see what happens. It’s going to be very interesting,” said Steve Edinger, acting administrator of California’s Office of Spill Prevention and Response.

Other developments:

* Legislation has also been introduced at the federal level to make ships safer and assess and improve vessel tracking procedures.

* Around 14 investigations have been launched into the incident, including a key review by the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board, due to be released in early January.

* Fleet Management has offered to plead no contest to charges of negligence and falsifying documents related to the spill. A judge has refused to accept the offer. The company was indicted by a federal grand jury and charged by the US Justice Department in July.

* Capt. John Cota, the pilot navigating the Cosco Busan at the time, also faces several criminal charges in connection with the spill.